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 Translation As a Social Fact 
 
Sergey Tyulenev  
 
ABSTRACT 
The article proposes a re-reading of classical works of one of the founding fathers of 
sociology, Emile Durkheim, in their applicability to translation research. It is argued that, 
since translation is a social phenomenon, TS, in theorizing translation, should learn from 
sociology in order not to reinvent the wheel. It is suggested that the sociology of 
translation should be distinguished from the psychology of translation in a 
methodologically clear way. Within the sociology of translation, studies of individual 
translations and translators, unless put into social context, do not help understanding 
translation as a social phenomenon. Methodology of the sociologically informed study of 
translation should not rely on common sense, which more often than not turns out to 
hamper, rather than help to see translation as a sociological phenomenon. In other words, 
translation is shown as a social fact and the need to study it as such is strongly 
emphasized.  
 
KEY WORDS: sociology and psychology of translation, Emile Durkheim, translation, 
social fact 
 
1. From Syncretism to Synthesis through Analysis  
 
Translation Studies (TS) is at a bifurcation point. If the history of TS can be described as 
a series of turns (Snell-Hornby 2006; 2010), then there are more or less clear signs that 
studying social involvements of translation with the help of sociological theory may also 
be seen as yet another turn (Wolf 2010). It is being discussed in TS today whether 
translation should consider translator or translation, whether agency or structure should 
be the primary focus of translation research. The deeper implication of this sort of 
discussions, which does not seem to have been fully appreciated, is whether we should be 
content staying in the psychological domain, perhaps now and then drawing inspiration 
from sociological theories, or to incorporate the latter fully into our purview. Moreover, 
we face another issue—which of the two domains, psychology or sociology, if any, 
should be given pre-eminence? Not everybody may have realized the predicament of 
combining the two, but the predicament is there and should be resolved somehow: the 
hybrid of psycho-sociology created because we do not know better will not survive.  
It seems that preferring translators to translations, thus putting the ‘translators vs. 
translation’ dilemma outside the ‘sociology vs. psychology’ polemics, does not contradict 
our sociological pursuits but, emphatically, no study of translators is possible without 
understanding what constitutes translation as a social phenomenon. Such understanding 
may be scientific or only commonsensical, but behind any TS research there must be an 
implied understanding of what constitutes translation as a social practice. Indeed, how 
can translator be called translator without explicit or implicit, scientific or at least 
commonsensical, clear or vague but some sort of vision of the type of action
1
 which s/he 
performs and by virtue of which s/he may be called translator? If anybody arguing for 
relativizing the definition of translation would inquire in a deeper way into how s/he 
 conducts her/his translation research, there will be found an idea, perhaps well-hidden yet 
still lurking beneath the surface, of what translation is, for how can one start any research 
without at least a working idea of what is to be researched?  
By the same token, translation as agency is only the other side of translation as 
structure. No matter how hard we try, while unravelling the interplay of structure and 
agency in translation, to debunk the structure’s primacy, we end up bumping into 
structure at the end of all our syllogistic paths and passages in the maze of even the most 
sophisticated pro-agency argument. Indeed, agency is structuralized by and is further 
structuralizing its structure because as fish cannot live without water, agency cannot exist 
without structure. Anthony Giddens hits the nail on the head when he writes that what 
“Durkheim frequently refers to as the “cult of the individual,” is created by society: it is 
this very fact which demonstrates the inadequacy of utilitarianism as a social theory, 
because what it takes as its premise is actually the outcome of a long-term process of 
social development” (1971: 211). 
Reality is much richer than any binaries but when priorities of scholarly research 
come to the fore, the point is not to find a theory which would describe all reality in all its 
complexity, because that is impossible. Any scholarly research inevitably reduces reality: 
any binary research—at the expense of showing the continuum; any non-binary 
research—at the expense of the clarity of the involved oppositions. Thus, as in theology, 
in order not to be condemned as a heretic, one starts “Credo in Unum…” but continues 
naming all the hypstasies of the Trinity or vice versa, in sociologically informed studies, 
the other type of research should be acknowledged.  
The problem in science is that there is a methodology of research which would be 
different depending on whether we start at one of the extremes or focus on the continuum 
in between. The challenge, therefore, is how to find such an angle which would allow the 
scholar to conduct a methodologically clear study of the phenomenon in question because 
otherwise, s/he has neither guarantee for her/himself nor any convincing proof for others 
that the results of his/her research are valid.  
Syncretism is not to be confused with synthesis. The former implies an 
amalgamation of phenomena mixed when one does not know better; the latter implies 
putting things together after studying them separately and coming to the conclusion that 
in order to understand the whole better, the studied parts are to be brought together again. 
Syncretism is ante; synthesis is post. 
No doubt, it is necessary to conduct research from both the viewpoint of 
translator/ess’ socialized individuality and from the viewpoint of translation qua social 
phenomenon, but as it turns out, that is not easy: neither good intentions, nor glazing 
(socio-)biographies with a few sociological terms and dropping magic names of 
sociological luminaries make the research a valid piece of sociologically informed 
scholarship, if the rest is old good life-stories with conjectures about how the translator 
felt or might have felt at school or at work and of what he dreamt (as if the translator 
confessed to the researcher). Such attempts remain quite superficial despite their 
professed sociological ambitions, because what they really try to aim at is socio-
psychology, but that, first, requires a clear understanding of the nature of both 
psychological and sociological research. Otherwise, the work is one thing on the level of 
theoretical ambitions and something quite different on the level of application. The 
conclusions drawn from such studies tend to be little more than commonsensical 
 platitudes having little explanatory force and as little applicability to biographies of other 
translators in the same region or beyond. In other words, psychology and sociology, like 
water and oil, remain separate and no socio-psychology results. 
My contention is that since translation is intrinsically a social phenomenon, which 
is a well-established fact in TS today, its social aspects which should be factored in, even 
if we conduct a study of an individual translator’s practice or output. That is why it is 
imperative to be clear in what sense and to what extent translation is a social 
phenomenon. This means that we cannot rely on our commonsensical understanding of 
translation as being influenced by / influencing society, and therefore (as simple as that!) 
being a social phenomenon. Such view is more advanced than seeing translation as only a 
matter of linguistic equivalence, but nevertheless only commonsensical: a social 
phenomenon is understood as something somehow related to society. Such is the 
underlying logic of nearly all sociologically minded TS research. And then the 
researcher, considering Square One as read, boldly steps into Square Two: How is 
translation related to society? Some explain it according to this sociological theory, some 
according to that, but the very fundamental question has escaped TS scholars’ attention 
all the way since they have started talking about translation in relation to sociology; 
without the ABC of sociology they have jumped over to Bourdieu, Lahire, Luhmann, 
Latour, Callon, Giddens, Renn, etc. As a result, not all in TS are convinced that 
translation is social to the extent that we need sociological theories; and those who are 
convinced (with rare exceptions) tend to churn out commonsensical, if not amateurish, 
psychological-cum-sociological case studies. 
Syncretic psychogical-cum-sociological study of translation will not do because 
what we aim at is a synthetic psychological-cum-sociological perspective, which, 
however, should pass the stage of the ‘psychological vs. sociological’ perspective. Then, 
when we know what the difference between the two is and how much psychology and 
how much sociology there is in translation, we can proceed to conducting more complex 
synthetic studies. The present-day TS is rather at the syncretic stage of its psycho-social 
efforts. 
A few words about terminology are called for. Translation has been considered as 
a social action in the sense of social activism (Zlateva 1993; Way 2008). There is nothing 
wrong in terming translation a social action in that sense, yet when we mean translation’s 
involvements in social processes, arguably, sociology and its established terminology 
must be our Ariadne’s thread. Sociology has been exploring the nature of the social for 
more than a century and has developed a finer sociological researcher’s toolkit than TS 
can boast. In sociology, the term ‘social action’ has a century-long usage. But the point is 
not even the term and there is no use in waging a war of terms—the concept behind it is 
at stake. My immediate purport is not so ambitious as to analyze the applicability and 
potential of sociology for TS in general. My task is much humbler: I would like to bring 
to translation scholars’ attention some important writings of one of the fathers of modern 
sociology—Emile Durkheim (1858–1917). His works are recognized as timeless classics 
and, I believe, are of special relevance for TS at the bifurcation, referred to above, 
because he grappled with the same issues—what exactly makes the social social. So, let 
us go back to Square One… 
There is no need to feel ashamed of having to learn from the sociology of 
Durkheim. In doing that, TS is joining a few other disciplines, including sociology itself 
 (Thompson 2004: xiii). Classics, such as Durkheim, “set a historical precedent which 
allowed others, later sociological analyses to develop” (Fish 2005: 4). Since TS is only 
starting to explore its object’s social properties, such classics of sociology as Durkheim’s 
should surely be welcomed as a basis for further development. 
At the turn of the nineteenth century (1890s–1917), Durkheim, as Kenneth 
Thompson claims, “contributed more to the founding of modern sociology than any other 
individual before or since” (Durkheim 2004: 1). Durkheim formulated the fundamental 
notions of sociology, such as ‘social fact’; he also outlined a strictly sociological method 
as well as produced a series of case studies where he demonstrated how to apply his 
method, among them—The Rules of Sociological Method (1895) and Suicide (1897), 
which will be in the centre of my discussion here. In 1898, Durkheim founded the journal 
L’Année sociologique, in which he published his own works and the works of his 
students with the goal of advancing sociology as a full-fledged scholarly discipline. 
Durkheim’s publications were, in Thompson’s words, “calculated to shock,” “his 
approach [being] deliberately counter-intuitive and opposed to taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the nature and causes of social phenomena” (Durkheim 2004: 2). 
Durkheim insisted that sociology had to have its own subject matter irreducible to any 
adjacent sciences’ subject matters, among them psychology and, particularly, the 
utilitarian philosophy’s view of society “as an aggregate of individuals acting rationally 
in terms of utility and self-interest” (Durkheim 2004: 2).  
To be sure, there have been developments in how social action is described in 
sociology after Durkheim, and I will incorporate some of such developments in my 
argumentation; but considering them in application to translation in a fuller way should 
become the subject of separate studies. Durkheim’s theory is taken up here in the 
conviction that his is the fundamental theory of social fact and such view of it warrants its 
re-reading as the basis of the present study. The focus on Durkheim’s theory can also be 
justified as a first step since no application of his fundamental theory has ever been 
attempted in TS. 
In what follows the terms psychology and sociology are used in Durkheimian 
sense, the most important difference between them is that the former seeks to explain 
individual actions, whereas the latter—collective. Durkheim defined sociology in The 
Rules of Sociological Method as “the science of institutions, of their genesis and of their 
functioning” (2004: 3). Such view of society, as we shall see, stores a great deal for the 
translation scholar.  
 
2. Sociology vs. Psychology 
 
Translation is a social phenomenon and, therefore, it should be studied sociologically. 
Sociological study of translation prompts us to apply to translation all properties of social 
action and, first of all, separate them from psychological phenomena. Durkheim insists, 
as the biological realm is separated from the psychological, so the psychological should 
be separated from the social. This leads to an important methodological requirement: 
“[…] we refuse to explain the more complex in terms of the more simple” (Durkheim 
2004: 54). This means that in our study we should never confuse individual and 
collective actions, yet that is not to say that we cannot study individual actions; the point 
 is how we explain what we observe—in terms of simpler psychological or more complex 
sociological reasons.   
In one of his classical works, showing how even seemingly purely individually 
(psychologically) determined actions may be, fundamentally, social actions, Emile 
Durkheim takes suicide as an example. Can suicide be of interest to the sociologist? 
Suicide seems to be “the act of an individual that concerns only that individual,” 
depending “entirely on individual factors,” therefore perhaps, it should interest only the 
psychologist because suicide is “normally explained by [an individual’s] temperament, 
his character, his antecedents and the events of his private history?” (Durkheim 2006: 21) 
But Durkheim disagrees with this commonsensical view of suicide and statistically shows 
that, in different periods of their history, different societies have different dispositions 
toward suicide, that is, the relationships between the number of suicides and the total 
population. The statistical expression of these dispositions is the rate of suicide-mortality 
of the society in question (Durkheim 2006: 24). It is such dispositions that come “within 
the orbit of sociology” (Durkheim 2006: 28). The focus of Durkheim’s attention is clearly 
kept apart from reasons for particular suicides; he investigates only larger pictures—more 
general conditions which determine the social rate of suicide:  
 
It is clear that the two questions are quite distinct, whatever relationship may otherwise exist 
between them. Among individual conditions, there are surely many that are not general enough to 
affect the ratio of the total number of voluntary deaths to the population. These may perhaps lead 
this or that isolated individual to kill himself regardless of whether the society as a whole has a 
stronger or weaker tendency to suicide. Just as these do not relate to a particular state of social 
organization, so they do not have any social repercussions. As a result, they concern the 
psychologist, not the sociologist. What the latter investigates are causes through which one may 
act not on individuals in isolation, but on the group. Consequently, among the factors of suicide, 
the only ones that concern us are those which have an effect on the whole of society. The suicide 
rate is the product of these factors, which is why we must concern ourselves with them. (Durkheim 
2006: 28-29)  
 
Durkheim’s inquiry into the social nature of suicide proceeds, firstly, to show that 
extra-social causes of suicide are quite restricted (neither the so-called suicidal 
monomania nor any psychopathic state cannot be considered as having “regular and 
incontrovertible relation to suicide”  (cf. Durkheim 2006: 39, 64)); secondly, to determine 
the nature of the social causes and the mechanism of their affecting different social 
groups and societies; and thirdly, to define the social element in suicide and its 
relationship with other social facts.  
We see that as the sociologist, Durkheim first and foremost separates the 
psychology from the sociology of suicide. The clarity of this methodological stance 
allowed him to find and describe what hitherto had been misunderstood—that suicide, 
contrary to common belief, is constituted primarily as a social action. As Richard Sennett 
summarizes, “Suicide asks us to focus on such matters as family size, nuclear family 
structure and upward mobility […]; it cautions us against looking for answers based on 
individual psychology” (in Durkheim 2006: xxiii). 
To be sure, translation is quite different from suicide in many ways. For example, 
it may be argued that the exposure to social influences in translation is longer, sometimes 
life-long, than rather in an impulsive decision to take one’s own life voluntarily. But as 
Durkheim showed suicide, however impulsive, is a result of continuous social forces 
 acting upon the person committing suicide. It is this part—the social influences—that is 
in the centre of his sociological pursuit; it is the social influences that make suicide and 
translation comparable. Therefore, the translation scholar can definitely learn from 
Durkheim’s study of suicide as an example of the application of sociological method. 
This is especially important because it is difficult—in such, commonsensically, 
individual actions as suicide and translation—to see the social through the individual. To 
cite Richard Sennett once again:  
 
The facts about which people are immediately conscious are misleading. Beneath this layer, 
people feel and think in other channels: my family is small or absent (egoism); I am not fighting 
beside my comrades (altruism); my success feels empty (anomie). […] Very few suicides are 
likely to leave a note which explains, ‘I am putting a pistol to my head because of anomie’. (In: 
Durkheim 2006: xxii-xxiii). 
  
And yet anomie it is nonetheless.  
To be sure, there are dynamics between the external and internal, psychological 
and sociological, in each suicide or translation case.  
 
In contemporary terms this sort of issues arises in debates about, for example, the way in which 
the personal is political […] Society is always both inside and outside—and Durkheim was well 
able to recognize this. (Craib 1997: 32)  
 
But first of all, arguably, he wanted to establish the sociological side of the problem: 
 
[…] social facts […] are external to and internal to (i.e. internalised by) any given individual; and 
they are only external to all existing individuals insofar as they have been culturally transmitted to 
them from the past. (Lukes 1971: 190)  
 
Regrettably, the present-day TS cannot boast a clear vision of translation as an 
object of sociologically informed research. Although the understanding that translation is 
a socially determined phenomenon has been steadily gaining ground, a large amount of 
research has been a mixture of biographies, portraits of translators and translatoresses, 
exciting stories about translators’ successes and failures, with accounts of 
translators’/translations’ influences on society—the latter’s language and culture, 
national(istic) discourses, mediation during war or peace, etc. To preclude any 
misunderstanding, this critique is not to be understood as a denial of socially relevant 
research, rather stating the lack of methodological clarity when psychological and 
sociological facts are not distinguished and are presented largely indiscriminately in a 
piece of research with little justification of putting them together. Mutatis mutandis, this 
is exactly why Durkheim criticized early sociologists: 
 
everything that we know about the way in which individual ideas combine together can be reduced 
to those few, very general and very vague propositions that are commonly called laws of the 
association of ideas. As for the laws of collective thinking, they are even less well known. Social 
psychology, whose task it should be to determine these laws is hardly more than a word which 
denotes all kinds of varied and imprecise generalities, without any defined object. (2004: 56) 
 
Sociology views human actions as “elements of wider figurations” (Bauman 
1990: 7-8). This means that human actions are seen as performed by mutually dependent 
 actors. This mutual dependency is understood as the probability of each social action, its 
performance or/and its chance of success, being determined directly or indirectly by 
relations between actors. Sociology considers human actions in “webs of mutual 
dependence” (Bauman 1990: 8). Single actors interest sociology as units in networks of 
interdependencies. This point of view which is fundamental for sociology is sometimes 
forgotten when, for instance, in their attempt to apply Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus, some translation scholars use habitus interchangeably with biography or life 
stories. For example, in Torikai 2009, chapter 3 “Habitus” starts as follows: “In this 
chapter, life stories of the five pioneer interpreters in their earlier years will be 
introduced” (p. 49). The next chapter associates another Bourdieu’s concept field with 
life stories: “In this chapter, life stories of the five interpreters will be examined focusing 
on the beginning of their career, to see how they went into the ‘field’ of interpreting” (p. 
85). Bourdieu’s concept habitus, however, is fundamentally sociological (aiming at 
seeing “the social in the individual, the general in the particular” (Bauman 1990: 10)) 
and cannot be reduced to biography or life story, because its focus is the interdependence 
of actors, their being influenced by society and their influencing society, nothing less 
than this two-way traffic—towards to the actor and from him/her, and especially the 
complex nature and divers dynamics of this traffic.  
In present-day TS, describing habitus is quite popular and is seen to be as a 
balanced solution of undesired binary oppositions ‘individual vs. society’ and ‘agency vs. 
structure’. Yet depicting a translator’s habitus, which boils down to describing how s/he 
came to love books, grew up and went to school in a bilingual/bicultural 
(multilingual/multicultural) environment and then, as a grownup, translated 
despite/according to socially determined tendencies—is not the translator’s habitus, but a 
biography; such descriptions explain little if TS in its sociological pursuits is to claim to 
be a scholarly discipline with the ability to go beyond individuals and be able to 
generalize studied phenomena. I do not argue against case studies in TS, what I argue is 
that the scholar should look further and ask her/himself, after conducting a case study: 
What does the study of a particular, of an individual show us about the general, which is 
general because it is collective?   
Social phenomena cannot be explained by psychological factors, therefore, “in 
order to understand the way in which society conceives of itself and the world that 
surrounds it, it is the nature of society and not that of individuals which must be 
considered” and “even if individual psychology held no more secrets for us, it could not 
provide the solution to any one of [social] problems, since they relate to orders of facts of 
which it is ignorant” (Durkheim 1982: 40-41). If so, what does a deeper understanding of 
a life story of a translator tell us about translation?  
To preclude any misunderstanding, psycho-sociological research was not denied 
by Durkheim, contrary to superficial criticisms: 
 
But once this difference in nature [between psychological and social facts] is acknowledged one 
may ask whether individual representations and collective representations do not nevertheless 
resemble each other, since both are equally representations; and whether, as a consequence of 
these similaritities, certain abstract laws might not be common to the two domains. Myths, popular 
legends, religious conceptions of every kind, moral beliefs, etc, express a different reality from 
individual reality. Yet it may be that the manner in which the two attract or repel, join together or 
separate, is independent of their content and relates solely to their general quality of being 
representations. While they have been formed in a different way they could well behave in their 
 interrelationships as do feelings, images or ideas in the individual. Could not one, for example, 
believe that proximity and similarity, contrasts and logical oppositions act in the same way, no 
matter what things are being represented? Thus one arrives at the possibility of an entirely formal 
psychology which might form a common ground between individual psychology and sociology. 
This is maybe why certain minds feel scruples at distinguishing too sharply between the two 
sciences.” (Durkheim 1982: 41)  
 
Susan Jones considers criticisms levelled at Durkheim for, allegedly, neglecting micro-
questions and psychology as based on misunderstanding or insufficient knowledge of 
Durkheim (Jones 2001: 132-133). 
Determining causes giving rise to a social fact are to be found among antecedent 
social facts, and “not among the states of the individual consciousness” (Durkheim 2004: 
76), because the collective consciousness is distinct from the individual consciousness, 
though “it can only be realised through individuals” (cited in Lukes 1971: 184).  
Durkheim explains the break between psychology and sociology by referring to 
the break between biology, physics and chemistry. The difference between social and 
psychological facts is not only that of quality, but of a substratum, environments and 
conditions of their existence. Social and psychological facts have completely different 
natures because they are different representations:  
 
The mentality of groups is not the mentality of individuals; it has its own laws. The two sciences 
[psychology and sociology] are, therefore, as clearly distinct as two sciences can be, whatever 
relationships there might otherwise be between them. (Durkheim 2004: 55) 
 
If TS had a clear understanding of this, there would be no difficulties with 
Luhmann’s theorizing of society as composed of social actions and not of human beings. 
There could be disagreements and different argumentation could be suggested, but 
Luhmann’s views would be not, as they are, a stumbling block for quite a few of 
translation students. There would not be naïve attempts to explain translation as a social 
phenomenon by showing individual translators/translators and their experiences, that is, 
“by the states of the individual consciousness,” rather, instead, there would be more 
research on “collective representations” going far beyond simple generalizations about 
collective representations as means of expressing how “the group thinks of itself in its 
relations with objects that affect it” (Durkheim 2004: 55). Groups, the object of 
sociological study, and individuals are constituted differently and are affected by 
different things. Hence,  
 
representations which express neither the same subjects nor the same objects cannot depend on the 
same causes. To understand the way in which a society conceives of itself and the world that 
surrounds it, we must consider the nature of the society, not the nature of the individuals. 
(Durkheim 2004: 55)
2 
  
The sociological view of translation (qua social action) implies drawing larger 
pictures, going beyond any particular individual translation act or translator/interpreter as 
an individual. In the particular, we should strive to see more general—socially relevant—
patterns. We should include into our vision translation as a sum total of all past, present, 
future, actualized and possible translation events, the aim being to study translation as a 
particular social phenomenon different from any other social phenomenon—a social 
phenomenon sui generis—manifested in a particular translation act(or).  
 If, on the contrary, translations are to be viewed as intrinsically individual 
manifestations of individual wills, resisting larger generalisations, then each translation 
act becomes an object of primarily psychological research. In the latter case however, it 
becomes not quite clear how we can identify different psychological acts as belonging to 
translation activity. If such fundamental question is impossible to resolve, what can we 
say about the ways (from the modern viewpoint) of handling texts and languages and 
emerging national cultures in antiquity or middle ages (McElduff and Sciarrino 2011)? 
On which basis can they be compared (or can they?) with modern social phenomena to 
which we refer as translations (Swansea 2010)? Or on what ground can different regional 
types of mediating texts between languages and cultures be juxtaposed (Bandia et Bastin 
2010; Ricci and Van der Putten 2011)?  
It cannot be overemphasized that declaring and theorizing translation as a 
psychological act inevitably brings us to a logical impasse. Indeed, if translation acts are 
psychological acts then how do we account for connection between them? The principle 
Translation is whatever called translation would no longer do, because our epistemology 
turns out to be based on common sense, and such ground, as postcolonial research makes 
only too clear, is shaky and cannot claim to be scientific. At this point, no matter what 
our convictions are, we have to acknowledge the social backdrop against which all 
translations are translation, all individual translational phenomena are translational 
systemic phenomena, all psychologically studied translator/interpreter-related phenomena 
should finally be sociologically accounted for; otherwise, our research should be limited 
to the study of the role of mental and emotional factors for translational activities. 
Whenever we go beyond the psychological phenomena, we inevitably end up in the 
soci(ologic)al domain.   
To emphasize, when translation’s definition is left to translation practitioners and 
consumers of translation-as-a-product, which is implied in letting translation be whatever 
is called translation, is again suspect from the epistemological point of view. What if 
somewhere at some point of history what we would call translation was not referred to as 
translation at all? Shall we include this phenomenon into our research or leave it because 
it is not called translation? What if what we call translation is called match-maker or 
bird-decoy and some other not less surprising things (Cheung 2011) or if translation is 
compared to a Californian’s turning car (Robinson 1991: 261)? These questions may be 
turned the other way round: What if something is called translation, as is the case in some 
types of discourse, but translation means something quite different from what we are used 
to seeing as translation, e.g. in the actor-network theory (Callon 1986)? Shall we refuse to 
consider such translation as translation? But why, on what basis do we include and 
exclude some social activities into/from translation? Volens-nolens we bump into the 
fundamental question: what is translation? Appropriating Wittgenstein’s concept game 
does not save TS either: what activity shall we attach to translational activities and what 
activity shall we refuse such honour? There is yet another question to be answered: What 
language(s) should we select for our combing of seashores of the world continents in 
search of translation-like phenomena?  
Sociological generalizations about translation haunt us. Even if it is just one 
translator in focus, his/her work is impossible to account for out a social context. 
Translators cannot be studied without understanding what social activity constitutes them 
as translators. Translation is always a socialized act (Toury 1995: 53-55). Translations 
 (plural) cannot be studied but as manifestations of translation (singular). Translation 
(singular) is a summative social activity comprised of all individual translations which 
interact and form vectors of preferences determining norms, standards, traditions, 
inclinations, etc., which are clear traces of the otherwise elusive translation. Norms and 
the rest are a sign of translation’s hidden yet sure presence. Over space and time, norms 
and the rest may be as different as different can be, but through translation1 (in one part 
of space and time) and through translation2 (in another)… and translationn, we 
inescapably come down to translation0, because if there is no translation0, how can 
translations1, 2… n be translations and multiple Translations one definitive Translation 
(Halverson 2010)? Noteworthy is that when Gideon Toury relativized translation, he, 
nonetheless, suggested the three postulates for defining translation (Toury 1995: 31). 
Resistance to a definitive Translation, because such definition of translation is feared by 
some TS scholars to impose something unifying on a variety of views of translation held, 
in the spirit of a rather misapplied post-colonialism, in different parts of the world, seems 
to be prompted by political-ideological reasons which have little to do with scholarship.  
Our firm belief is that it is not only a matter of what we call translations1, 2…n, we 
may call them simply 1, 2… n, but it is something intrinsic about all of them that makes 
them comparable. Quite simply, translation can be expressed formulaically as AMB, 
where A and B are interacting parties and M is the mediator between them, whatever 
forms this mediumistic structure may assume (Tyulenev 2011: 35-44; 57-64).  
The terms summative and sum total do not suggest simply adding all translations. 
The relationship between translations, on the one hand, and translation, on the other, 
exceeds a purely mathematic equation (1+1=2); rather, we deal with systemic 
relationships and social emergence. Different scopes may be focused upon—schools of 
translational thought and practice, historical periods or locales. Whatever our focus, one 
thing should be clear: no individual translation is reducible to itself, but should be 
regarded as a form of the translation medium. Translation is one of the principal social 
mechanisms facilitating social system’s interaction with the environment, being a social 
boundary phenomenon. Translation is ‘located’ on boundaries between interacting social 
units whatever they are; for the entire social system (not necessarily a nation-state, but 
any social unit—from a conversation to the world system—that can be described as a 
system). Such is, in a nutshell, the view of translation that underlies considering 
translation as a social phenomenon. These properties of translation were discussed at 
length elsewhere (Tyulenev 2011) and, therefore, we may proceed.  
  
3. What Is Wrong with Common Sense 
 
A few words should be said about common sense which can be defined as “that rich yet 
disorganized, non-systematic, often inarticulate and ineffable knowledge we use to 
conduct our daily business of life” (Bauman 1990: 8). Arguably, sociology of translation 
in TS today is based on commonsensical understanding of certain concepts. For instance, 
Tuija Kinnunen and Kaisa Koskinen complain that the notion agency is discussed 
extensively but “the easy adoption of the term in translation studies probably indicates 
that the issue merits a closer analysis than has been completed this far” (2010: 6). One of 
the results, Kinnunen and Koskinen continue with a helpful reference to Hélène Buzelin’s 
application of Latour’s Network Theory, is “equat[ing] individuals, agents and agency” 
 which “can prove problematic, since agency can be endowed to non-human actors, 
institutions and organizations, while the human agents may have significant obstacles for 
executing their agency.”3 Commonsensical vision of translator and his/her work is based 
on a largely commonsensical, tacitly agreed notion of both translator and translation. If 
those whom we decide to study as translators are simultaneously writers, critics, lawyers, 
philosophers, teachers, monks, priests, kings, diplomats, etc., how do we know that they 
are also translators? Obviously, we are likely to hear the answer: “Because they 
translated.” “What does it mean to translate?”—we would press for a more precise 
answer. At this point, any TS scholar, who learned well from Gideon Toury’s theory that 
the definition of translation should be left to those who does and/or uses it, would 
understand what such persistent questioning is driving at.
4
 Yet one could naively 
continue: How do we all, in all our case-studies, know that what we study is translation? 
Is that because translators do it? Or is it because we, TS scholars, study it? (Toury’s pains 
to avoid the circularity of argumentation boomerang on us.) Or is that only the term, in 
whatever language associated somehow with the English word translation, that assures us 
that we are still looking at translation and not some other animal? Arguably, our scholarly 
TS common sense is our only guide, whether we admit it or not. We have seen translation 
long enough to recognize it even in the disguised post-colonial avatars but instead of 
trying to formulate what precisely makes translation translation, despite its name truly 
being legion, we still rely on our common sense, “rich yet disorganized, non-systematic, 
often inarticulate and ineffable knowledge [that] we use to conduct our daily business of” 
scholarly research. 
To take leave of our common sense when we attempt to study translation from a 
sociological point of view is, however, absolutely imperative. Such is the indispensable 
requirement and challenge of sociology, which deals with supra-individual phenomena 
where common-sense logic does not apply. Even “when we believe ourselves to be free 
of common-sense judgements they take us over unawares,” and the reader of Durkheim’s 
The Rules of Sociological Method is advised not to forget this, because our “usual ways 
of thinking are more likely to be adverse rather than favourable to the scientific study of 
social phenomena […]” (2004: 53) 
Durkheim’s discussion of the key word for his study ‘suicide’ is interesting in 
comparison with TS’ predicament as regards the term translation. The word ‘suicide’ as 
it is used in daily conversations, Durkheim says, seems to make any definitions 
superfluous. Yet if the scientist relies on commonsensical usage of words, s/he 
 
lay[s] himself open to the word so vaguely defined that it varies from one instance to another 
according to the demands of the conversation, but it also results in categories of quite different 
things being brought vaguely together under the same heading or else realities of the same kind 
being called by different names, since the classification which produces them does not derive from 
any methodical analysis, but merely expresses the confused impressions of ordinary people. […] 
Thus our first task must be to decide the order of things that we propose to study under the heading 
of ‘suicide’. To do so, we shall consider whether, among different kinds of death, there are some 
which have in common characteristics that are objective enough to be recognized by any observer 
of good faith and particular enough not to be met with elsewhere, but at the same time close 
enough to those that are commonly understood by the term of ‘suicides’ for us to be able to 
employ this same term without violence to everyday usage. […] (Durkheim 2006: 15-16) 
 
 Admittedly, in its short but dynamic history, TS initially took exactly the route 
advised by Durkheim—TS tried to define translation in as strict and scientific a way as 
Durkheim attempted to define suicide. Yet TS reconsidered its strategy seeing that too 
narrow (linguistic equivalence-centred) definitions did not work because they distorted 
the describing of the praxis and understandings of translation in all their complexity as 
observed over space and time. Then, Toury suggested to shed too narrow a vision of 
translation by suggesting the notion of ‘assumed translation’ (1982: 27; 1995: 31). This 
opened TS to the fecund research which has been conducted within both descriptive, and 
sociocritical, and cultural, and postcolonial, and sociological paradigms. Yet at the same 
time, TS has gone too far and, by claiming that defining translation is a moot question, 
laid itself at the mercy of uncritical commonsensical notions of translation offered by 
whoever, whenever and wherever. The three postulates, suggested by Toury, limiting 
understanding of translation and saving TS from anarchy have not been jettisoned but 
mentioning them is considered unacceptable, but if we scratch any relativized translation 
research, whether colonial or post-colonial, whether synchronic or diachronic, whether 
contemporary or historical, under the surface, we are sure to find an implied definition 
(for how can you study something without knowing at least vaguely what you are 
studying?) similar to Toury’s postulates lurking behind the scenes. The definition of 
translation has been considered so moot a question that it has virtually not been mooted 
any more. The result is that all research is underpinned by some basic, fundamental 
understanding of translation which is left undiscussed, and on the surface, researchers 
pile up commonsensical definitions of translation borrowed from practitioners or users. 
TS has come full circle and probably it is time to go back to where TS, enriched thanks to 
the relativization of the vision of translation, started. The time has come to unearth the 
implied visions of translation and explicate them; the time has come to move from 
Toury’s liberating definition of translation to his modifying postulates (although taking 
them out of predominantly literary context).  
Translation should be inquired into with a great deal of naïveté in order to 
overcome our common sense. In this connection, it is instructive to see how Durkheim 
explained why it is necessary to look at social phenomena as things. First of all, he makes 
it clear that he does not mean to say that social facts are material things. He says that the 
former are “things by the same right as material things, though in a different way” and 
continues as follows: 
 
What, in fact, is a thing? A thing differs from an idea in the same way that what we know from the 
outside differs from what we know from the inside. A thing is any object of knowledge which our 
understanding does not naturally penetrate; it is everything that we cannot adequately 
conceptualize by a simple process of mental analysis; it is everything that the mind cannot succeed 
in understanding except by going outside itself in the form of observations and experiments, which 
progress from the most external and most immediately accessible characteristics to those which 
are least visible and most profound. To treat facts of a certain order as things is not, therefore, to 
classify them in a particular category of reality; it is rather to observe a particular mental attitude 
towards them. We begin the study of them by adopting the principle that we are totally ignorant of 
what they are, and that their characteristic properties, like the unknown causes on which they 
depend, cannot be discovered even by the most careful introspection. (2004: 54-55) 
 
 With this kind of naïveté, we should, after all these decades of enriching and 
enlightening research, come back ad fontes. Such homecoming should observe the 
following principles (based on the principles in Durkheim 2004: 65-66):  
 
(1) We should guard against relapses of common sense in the form of preconceived notions (e.g., 
what translation, translator or agency are). 
(2) Research should identify and define phenomena which are put into the same group based on 
certain external characteristics. 
(3) The group under investigation should allow including all phenomena which fit the definition. 
(4) When translations are studied as social facts, they should be considered “from an aspect where 
they appear separate from their individual manifestations.”  
 
Principle (4), if we choose to take heed of Durkheim’s vision of sociology, should 
alert us against all studies, which do not separate individual manifestations of social facts 
from their general aspects. This is not to say that such investigations are wrong but 
usually the risk is that the researcher (especially without sociological training) would 
concentrate on individual life-stories and forget that they are to be shown through the 
prism of the socially generalizable in them. (Emphatically, there is nothing wrong in 
writing biographies but one should think twice before claiming to have produced 
sociological research of translation or translator.) As Anthony Giddens helps us 
understand: 
 
[…M]ost secondary interpreters of Durkheim have failed to connect his analytical discussion (and 
rejection) of individualism as a methodological approach to social theory with his developmental 
conception of the emergence of individualism as a morality brought into being by the growth of 
the differentiated division of labour. […] Durkheim’s writings represent an attempt to detach 
“liberal individualism,” regarded as a conception of the characteristics of the modern social order, 
from “methodological individualism.” […Durkheim’s] attempt to detach moral from 
methodological individualism is much more subtle and profound than has been assumed by many 
of his critics, what results is a brittle synthesis and essentially an unsatisfactory one. (1971: 210, 
222) 
 
Giddens makes it clear that “sociology cannot be based upon a theory which treats the 
individual as the starting-point of analysis […]” (1971: 211) One should be careful, if 
s/he claims to conduct sociologically informed research, to paint a portrait of a socialized 
individual, the focus and, hence, methodology should be verified and properly balanced.  
Another manifestation of common sense in TS is that TS scholars do not properly 
discriminate between social activism and studying translation. Struggling for the social 
awareness of translation and translators/interpreters is a noble undertaking but it is not to 
be confused with scholarly research because such confusion is likely to result in a bias 
and conscious or subconscious distortions. Objectivity thrives on non-judgmental spirit 
and has nothing to do with rallying forces for a cause. In Durkheim’s words, “good and 
evil do not exist in science” (Durkheim 2004: 67). As Mary Douglas, studying religions 
building on Durkheimian theory, observes: 
 
At very least, the moral bias has to be unloaded, and the language of exhortation and reprimand 
needs to be cooled. Appeal to the emotions has to be eliminated. This is precisely what Durkheim 
tried to do when he asked us to pay attention to ‘social facts’ and to abjure basing explanations on 
‘psychology’. Wanting to establish a unified theory of society and knowledge, he needed to tidy 
up the language, to uncover hidden emotional cargoes and throw them overboard. (2008: xv) 
  
As any science, sociology is postulated as “devoid, or nearly, of all practical 
effectiveness, and is therefore without real justification for its existence” (Durkheim 
2004: 67). Translation theorists should not have a complex of inferiority and keep on 
justifying their research giving reasons why translation studies matter. The most common 
argument against translation theory is that it has little to help translation practitioners who 
either can translate without theory or need only some practical training. Translation 
theory exists because translation exists, and no doubt theory helps practice. The 
mechanism of their relationship can be seen as the mechanism of the relationship 
between language and linguistics. We can speak without linguistics, yet those who want 
to work with language surely perform better when they study how language and their 
own language(s) work which is explained to them by linguistics. Who questions the 
necessity to study linguistics? Translation practitioners, who deny the necessity of theory, 
may be gifted but shortsighted, and why should translation theorists listen to them? 
Should the linguist listen to a native speaker of a language who doubts the raison d’être 
of linguistics? 
Another thing is how to justify TS when its existence is challenged by sister-
sciences, such as applied linguistics and comparative literature. Without going into 
details, I would say that TS has not done enough in defining its unique subject matter, 
sticking obstinately to interlingual transfer and brushing aside suggestions to look into 
broader investigations of transfer phenomena. We may decide to return to “translation 
proper” (Jakobson 2000: 114), but we need to explore other types of translation in order 
to make a well-informed decision. Some explain their choice of interlingual translation 
saying that such translation does not presuppose the change of channel “with an increased 
number of differences from the ‘original’ in all layers, including the intentional one” 
(Dollerup 1999: 305). The problem with this kind of statements, however, is that 
although any translation student even superficially acquainted with TS functionalism 
would raise her/his eyebrows to the final clause, yet s/he is likely to agree with the 
refutation of intersemiotic translation (changing the channel) and would not be bothered 
to consider why not accepting the functionalist paradigm is any worse than not accepting 
intersemiotic translation? Or is the latter not translation and Jakobson-semiotician was 
simply carried away in including this transfer into the group of phenomena which he 
categorised as translation? If so, why is his article On Linguistic Aspects of Translation 
considered a classic and included into TS readers? Perhaps, we had better exclude the 
article from our canon as a potential source of heresies? If he is right, however, by 
Principle (3) above, the group under investigation should include all phenomena, which 
fit the definition, and the job of the scholar is to investigate what makes intersemiotic 
translation similar to the other types of translation and in what it is different from them 
forming a subgroup. Arguably, it is in this kind of studies that the future of TS lies 
because such studies promise to provide TS with its unique and unrivalled subject matter. 
 
4. Social Fact 
 
What is a social fact? This is the central concept of Durkheim’s theory and one of his 
most important contributions to sociology. Social facts are defined by Durkheim as 
“ways of acting or thinking, recognizable by the distinguishing characteristic that they are 
 capable of exercising a coercive influence over individual consciousness” (2004: 56). 
Social facts as any social phenomena are external to individuals (Durkheim 2004: 55).  
Describing the influence that social facts have on individuals, Durkheim 
introduces the notion of social constraint, which, according to him, implies  
 
that collective ways of acting or thinking possess a reality outside the individuals who, at any 
moment in time, conform to it. They are things which have their own existence. The individual 
encounters them already formed and he can do nothing to eliminate them or to change them; he is 
obliged to take account of them and it is so much more difficult (though not impossible) for him to 
change them, since, in varying degrees, they share in the material and moral supremacy that 
society exercises over its members. (2004: 57)  
 
Note that Durkheim does not deny that individuals have their role in creating 
social constraints. (His critics do not always duly appreciate this aspect of his theory.) 
Yet it always takes more than one individual to influence social facts. The resulting 
synthesis of individual wills is a product external to each participating individual taken 
separately. Hence, we pass on from individuals to institution, which Durkheim defines as 
“all beliefs and all modes of behaviour instituted by the collectivity […]” (2004: 57). 
Therefore, sociology is “the science of institutions, their genesis and their functioning” 
(Durkheim 2004: 57). Importantly, only socially determined human actions are social 
facts. Biological functions, such as breathing or sleeping are not social facts; but social 
roles we play, for example as a member of a family or of an organization, are social facts 
because they are socially determined and, in that sense, the practices we follow “function 
independently of the use [we] make of them” (Durkheim 2004: 58).  
 The coerciveness of social facts is manifested in that they resist a change: 
“…social facts [are considered] as things whose nature, however flexible and malleable, 
is nevertheless not modifiable at will” (Durkheim 2004: 53). One is imprisoned if s/he 
breaks a law; one is deprecated if s/he does not act in accordance with a custom or does 
not meet expectations. Social facts are social exactly because they originate not with an 
individual. They “can have no other substratum then society, either the political society 
as a whole, or one of the groups that in part compose it, such as religious denominations, 
political, literary and professional associations, etc.” (Durkheim 2004: 59). Theorizing 
translation on the social level should always be conducted with this in mind: social facts, 
translation included, are “the proper field of sociology” (Durkheim 2004: 59).  
 At this point, Durkheim addresses those of his critics who think that his theory is 
making individual members of society marionettes: 
 
It is true that when we define them [social facts] by the word ‘constraint’, we risk infuriating those 
who zealously support absolute individualism. Since they maintain that the individual is 
completely autonomous, it appears to them that the individual is diminished every time he is made 
to feel that he is not completely self-determined. But since it is indisputable that most of our ideas 
and inclinations are not developed by ourselves, but come from outside, they can only become part 
of us by being imposed upon us. […Yet] any social constraint does not necessarily exclude the 
individual personality. (2004: 59)  
 
Among social constraints, there are well-defined social systems such as law, 
religious dogmas, financial institutions but also less defined such as social currents. The 
latter is obvious in a crowd or group protesting or supporting something. No individual 
can be identified as the source of the group’s enthusiasm or indignation. These emotions 
 are shared and intensified by the entire group; they come to each participant from outside. 
As long as we go along with this current we may think that there is no pressure exerted 
upon us; but this pressure will readily manifest itself as soon as we decide to resist the 
general flow. “We are, therefore, victims of an illusion, which makes us believe that we 
ourselves have produced what was imposed on us from outside […]” (Durkheim 2004: 
60) 
TS has less difficulty with recognizing this dependence of statistically summed up 
translations or translators (schools, trends of translation) on social institutions (translation 
bureaus, publishing business, dominant norms and standards, etc.). It is, perhaps, more 
difficult for us to admit such influence or, rather, its heaviness on the individual level. 
There, it seems, somehow, the pressure is not as heavy. But it should be remembered that 
as the air pressure is no weaker or stronger on each individual human being than the 
crowd, so is the social pressure. We are still having a range of possibilities (from acting 
according to an imposed norm to resisting to act) but what is important and often 
forgotten is that the translator is always socially contextualized or, more precisely, 
socialized and her/his range of possibilities of action is determined by society even in 
what resistance options s/he has. Degrees of freedom are also socially determined. This 
becomes obvious if, for example, we compare how and for what a translator would be 
punished for her/his resistance in contemporary and medieval European society.  
But the question is not so much about freedom or lack thereof. The key is social 
interdependence. This interdependence and its manifestations should be the subject of 
sociologically informed translation research. It is a challenge to go beyond the individual 
commonsensical visibilities.  
 
At first sight [social facts such as inclinations towards suicide in a particular society] seem 
inseparable from the forms they assume in particular cases. But statistics provide us with the 
means of isolating them. [Studying individual phenomena is not excluded but should be 
complemented with statistical approaches:] For, since each of these figures includes all individual 
cases without discrimination, the individual circumstances which may play some part in producing 
the phenomenon cancel each other out and, consequently, do not enter into its determination. What 
the average expresses, therefore, is a specific state of the collective mind. (Durkheim 2004: 60-61) 
 
To be sure, statistical methods of overcoming commonsensical view of social facts are 
not the only type of methods. Modern sociology employs both quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies, and we, TS scholars, may learn more about them from 
sociologists. 
Social things are the “embodiment of the ideas” people have about society and its 
institutions. Such ideas are the object of study of the sociologist (Durkheim 2004: 63). 
Yet the sociologist or the sociologist of translation should be careful about how and 
where these ideas may be found. Let us not forget that social things are things and that 
means they are to be treated as external entities and only as such, as external data, that 
they can be used in research.  
 In addition to what has been said above, society and social facts are also to be 
theorized as things in the sense of their social visibility. Somebody’s thoughts are socially 
invisible until they become socially visible as gestures, words and phrases, behaviour, 
etc., that is, something that is communicable to other members of society. Such 
communicated things constitute social fabric, which is the subject matter of sociology, 
including the sociology of translation.  
 Modal clauses, such as the translator must have felt/thought, let alone the 
translator dreamed about…, are no more than the researcher’s guesswork and have 
nothing to do with sociology, because no researcher has some magic X-rays that can 
directly penetrate the social thing-in-itself. We can judge about the thing, a stone or a 
beast or another human being or a social fact, only based on what is projected by that 
thing from inside out, made somehow detectable and observable. How can we be sure 
that the translator dreamed about something? Socio-translational facts are to be held 
separately from our guesses what translators think while producing translations. And 
what do those dreams, even if there were true, have to do with sociology? Once again, in 
Durkheim’s own words:   
 
[…] social phenomena are things and should be treated as things […T]hey are the only data 
available to the sociologist. A thing is, in effect, everything that is given, offered, or rather forced 
upon, our observation. To treat phenomena as things is to treat them as data which provide the 
starting point for science. […Moreover, w]e must consider social phenomena in themselves, 
separate from the conscious beings who represent them; we must study them from the outside as 
external things, for it is in this guise that they appear to us. […] Even phenomena which most 
seem to consist of arbitrary arrangements must still be considered from this perspective. (2004: 63-
64) 
  
But even if individual translators are studied properly, one should be very careful 
(and it is not easy for us translation scholars who largely cannot boast special sociological 
training) to keep a distance between her/himself and the object of study, that is, to see the 
translator/translation as a thing-in-itself, about which we can judge only based on social 
visible evidence, on the one hand, and the individual object of study (translator or 
translation) and the social context, on the other hand. The individual object of study 
should not be viewed as somebody/something, which can be added to another one and yet 
another one—and we get society. That is why, in studying social properties of translation, 
the researcher, when looking at the individual, should keep her/his eyes on the collective. 
Translation as a social fact cannot exist if there are no individual translation acts, yet, 
with translation it is exactly as with the ‘society vs. individuals’ dilemma: “society is not 
the mere sum of individuals, but the system formed by their association represents a 
specific reality which has its own characteristics” (Durkheim 1982: 129). Therefore, 
individual translator’s habituses are a necessary, but not sufficient condition of theorizing 
translation as a social phenomenon:  
 
The group thinks, feels and acts entirely differently from the way its members would if they were 
isolated. If therefore we begin by studying these members separately, we will understand nothing 
about what is taking place in the group. (Durkheim 1982: 129)  
  
5. Conclusion 
 
There are more promising lines of research which Durkheim’s classical thought prompts, 
than I have mentioned. For instance, it would be instructive to delve into the principles of 
distinguishing between normal and morbid, or pathological, social facts (2004: 68-70). 
This may lead the translation researcher to find ideas about how to study translation from 
the topological and comparative points of view and to resolve a conflict of opinions 
between what Durkheim calls the ‘historian vs. philosopher’ dispute or the nominalism of 
 the historians (who view societies as constituted of a multitude of individual and 
incomparable types) and the extreme realism of the philosophers (for whom “all special 
groupings […] are only contingent and provisional aggregates without any individual 
reality,” “only humanity being real, and it is from the general attributes of human nature 
that all social evolution derives”):  
 
Consequently, for the historians history is only a sequence of events which are linked together but 
do not repeat themselves; for the philosophers these same events have value and interest only as an 
illustration of the general laws which are inscribed in the constitution of men and which hold sway 
over the course of historical development. (Durkheim 1982: 108)   
 
To be sure, these ideas would help shed more light on discussions about the degree of 
generalizations vs. particularizations in TS.  
Another important issue is the pre-eminence of the collective in the sociological 
perspective as compared to the general. It is important to stress the hierarchy between the 
two, because common sense would have them in the opposite order and thereby missing 
the point about sociological facts as independent from their individual manifestations and 
simplistic qualitative conceptions of collectivity:  
 
It may be objected that a phenomenon can only be collective if it is common to all members of the 
society, or at the very least, to a majority, and, therefore, if it is general. This is certainly so, but if 
it is general it is because it is collective (that is, more or less obligatory), rather than it being 
collective because it is general. It is a group condition which is repeated in the individuals because 
it is imposed upon them. It is found in each part because it is in the whole, rather than it being in 
the whole because it is in the parts. (Durkheim 2004: 61-62) 
  
Such and similar fresh counter-intuitive sociological ideas may turn out a source of 
inspiration and definitely of revelation for translation students.   
Earlier I made a point about the issues with the term action understood as a social 
fact vs. social activism. Yet another example may be provided where confusion in 
terminology issues may hamper methodologically clear theorizing. Such and similar 
problems might be encountered if cultural vs. social are not properly distinguished. It is 
suggested that translation as a cultural practice is associated with “power, ideology and 
similar issues” (Wolf 2010: 342). But both power and ideology are considered bona fide 
social issues actively discussed by leading sociologists, such as Max Weber, Talcott 
Parsons, Nikolas Lehmann, Reinhardt Bendix, Julien Freund, Peter M. Belau and many 
others (Walkman, Tutsis, and Ziti 1977; Elias 1978; Lehmann 1975; Bauman 1990: 107-
124). What is, then, the difference between cultural and social? If so, Andrew 
Chesterman is right in saying that the research which is categorized as informed by 
cultural studies, is, in fact, closer to sociology, and he urges us to draw a line between 
sociological and cultural issues. Adding psychological issues to these two categories, 
Chesterman suggests a tripartite map of translation research (in Duarte, Assis Rosa, and 
Seruya 2006, 11):  
 
1) cultural (values, traditions, ideas and ideologies);  
2) sociological (translators’ observable group behavior and the institutions in which they work); 
3) cognitive (translation-related mental processes, decision-making).  
 
 It is still not quite clear on what grounds categories 1) and 2) are to be separated, since, 
according to Durkheimian logic, both are social facts and, hence, legitimate subjects of 
sociological research and, therefore, would require similar methodological approaches. In 
order to solve this problem, one should look into how sociology and cultural studies 
explain their relationship. Alternatively, perhaps, we should be content with the 
separation of translation research into psychological and social, as Durkheim suggests, 
and ask ourselves: What are manifestations of translation as social vs. psychological 
activity? 
 Finally, it should be said that it is advisable that TS scholars, in their attempts to 
theorize translation as a social activity, familiarize themselves with sociological theory. 
We should not dismiss classical sociological theories, thinking that the issues that 
concern the translation scholar today have changed so that classical theorists, like 
Durkheim, cannot help us anymore. TS, in its sociological attempts, when turning to 
Bourdieu, Luhmann, ANT, etc., does that over the head of the fathers of sociology, on 
whose theories modern sociology builds, and either misses some important points about 
theorizing the social completely or runs the risk of reinventing the wheel, exactly as Ian 
Craib warns us (1997: 2).  
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NOTES 
 
1. Since in this paper my purport is not so much to show translation as social action in terms of its structure 
and properties but to elaborate on it as a social phenomenon, I use the term ‘social action’ virtually as a 
synonym of the term ‘social action’, only with that difference that the latter is broader in its meaning and 
includes social action as its hyponym. 
 
2. See more on Durkheim’s dichotomies ‘sociology/psychology’ and ‘collective vs. individual’ in Lukes 
1971: 193-7. 
 
3. It should be noted in passing that regrettably, the richer understanding of agency, suggested by the 
participants of the symposium ‘Translators’ Agency’ at the University of Tampere in 2008, fell victim to 
the same commonsensical equating translation’s agency only with human agency against which the editors 
of the symposium’s proceedings argued with the help of Buzelin. In their collective effort, they defined 
agency as “willingness and ability to act” where willingness is “linked to consciousness, reflectivity and 
intentionality, and it is not without some moral or ethical undertones” and “is largely individualistic and 
psychological by nature” (Kinnunen and Koskinen 2010: 6). How can non-human actors, like clams or 
computers (cf. Callon 1986), have such willingness? Also, psychology and sociology are not distinguished 
in the proposed definition. 
 
4. Toury’s relativizing of defining translation which is crucial for making TS more inclusive for empirical 
research, crucial for post-colonial studies of translation, is commonly curtailed and the balancing part of it 
with the three postulates (the source postulate, the transfer postulate, and the relationship postulate) are 
often left out, on whatever grounds. 
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